Evaluating the Expertise of Experts by Shrader-Frechette, Kristin S.
RISK: Health, Safety & Environment (1990-2002)
Volume 6 | Number 2 Article 7
March 1995
Evaluating the Expertise of Experts
Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/risk
Part of the Law Commons, Life Sciences Commons, Physical Sciences and Mathematics
Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons
This Conference Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – School of Law at University of New
Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in RISK: Health, Safety & Environment (1990-2002) by an authorized editor of
University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact ellen.phillips@law.unh.edu.
Repository Citation
Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Evaluating the Expertise of Experts, 6 RISK 115 (1995).
Evaluating the Expertise of Experts
Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette*
Introduction "
In 1994, the National Research Council, National Academy of
Sciences (NRC/NAS) Review Committee on Risk-Related Studies
issued its evaluation of NAS risk studies. The authors charged that
recent reports failed to maintain adequate distinction between risk
assessment and risk management.1 They said assessments should
provide "an independent analysis" of risk,2 and therefore "explicitly
distinguish conclusions.., based on facts... from judgments based on
values." 3 The good news about these recommendations is that they
attempt to provide a lock on the scientific objectivity and consequent
credibility of risk assessment, to secure it from the subjectivity of risk
management and to reaffirm the role of expertise in assessment. The
bad news is that the recommendations seem (perhaps unintentionally)
to rebut the claim rights of the public to participate in both risk
assessment and risk management.
According to one version of the dominant NRC/NAS
paradigm,4 known as "the Redbook," experts accomplish assessment
while stakeholders, members of the public, should not play a role until
the later stage of risk management. As the Redbook put it: "If risk
management considerations... are seen to affect... a risk assessment, the
* Professor Shrader-Frechette is Distinguished Research Professor at the University
of South Florida. She earned her undergraduate degrees (Mathematics and Physics)
from Xavier University and her Ph.D. (Philosophy) from the University of Notre
Dame.
1 National Research Council Review Committee on Risk Related Studies, Letter
Report on NAS Risk-Related Reports (1994).
2 Id. at 8.
3 Id at 12.
4 NRC/NAS Committee on the Institutional Means for Assessment of Risks to
Public Health, RiskAssessment in the Federal Government (1983) (the "Redbook");
see also, Carnegie Commission Task Force on Science and Technology in Judicial
and Regulatory Decisionmaking, Risk and the Environment 76 (1993).
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credibility of the assessment... can be compromised." 5 Obviously
much of this paradigm is correct. Separation between assessment and
management encourages people to make the epistemic warrants for
their claims explicit and thus to make their science more objective. 6 It
helps to avoid unscientific assessment and bad management. 7
Maintaining too sharp a distinction, however, has led to an "uneasy
divorce" between risk assessment and risk management, in part because
many risk assessors have ignored the value implications of their
methodological judgments. 8 Also, the divorce may lead to
uninformed and therefore faulty risk-management decisions.9
My concern is that too strong a distinction between risk assessment
and risk management can lead to the hegemony of expertise in
assessment areas where experts alone have no right to exercise complete
control. Too strong a distinction can underemphasize the unavoidable
value judgments in risk assessment, overemphasize the role of technical
experts, thus disenfranchise the public who ought to have a voice in risk
assessment as well as management.
Of course, although the rights of stakeholders to participate in the
policy decisions of risk management are not as problematic, the
public's role in risk assessment is controversial because the standard
view is that it is a "scientific process,"' 10 one in which only scientists
have a justification for participation. In these remarks, I challenge the
standard view that risk assessment is a purely scientific process and
therefore one in which the public has no right to participate; argue that
procedures for public involvement in risk assessment need not threaten
5 The Redbook, supra at 152.
6 Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality 43-44 (1991).
7 Ellen Silbergeld, Risk Assessment and Risk Management: An Uneasy Divorce, in
Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Management 102 ff (Deborah G.
Mayo & Rachelle D. Hollander, eds. 1991).
8 Id. at 107ff.
9 See, e.g., Richard M. Sedman & Paul W. Hadley, Risk Assessment and Risk
Management: Mending the Schism, 3 Risk 189 (1992).
10 See, e.g., NRC/NAS Committee to Review Risk Management in the DOE's
Environmental Remediation Program, Building Consensus through Risk Assessment
and Management of the Department of Energy's Environmental Remediation
Program 16(1994).
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scientific objectivity, as proponents of the standard view claim; and
argue that there are important strategies for involving the public and
moving to what Jonathan Lash calls an "integrated view" of
assessment.1 1
Experts Alone Ought Not Dictate Risk Assessment
At least four basic reasons give the public a right to participate in
risk assessments, despite their largely scientific character. The first and
most basic is logical: Numerous uncertainties underlie all of risk
assessment; how to behave in situations of scientific uncertainty is not a
scientific, but a policy, issue, one in which the public ought to have a
say. Were there no scientific uncertainties in risk assessment, grounds
for public participation would be weaker. As an NRC Committee put
it: Uncertainty causes the invocation of value-based judgments. 12
A second reason is ethical. Because assessments have consequences
not only for knowledge but also for public welfare, the public has a
right to participate. If my ox is in danger of being gored, I have the
right to help determine how to protect it, even if I may be wrong.
A third reason for public participation is ontological. Because risks
do not affect merely current health and safety, but also human
autonomy, consent, distributive equity, equal opportunity, future
generations, civil liberties, social stability and so on; scientific experts
ought not be the sole assessors. Assessments of multiattribute risks
should be the products of social, ethical, cultural and legal rationality
- not merely the projects of a bounded scientific rationality.
Fourth, because the applied science used in risk assessment
presupposes democratically determined goals, it can never be value-
neutral. 13 If the standard view of risk assessment disallows public
participation, it errs in reducing democratic and procedural values to
technocratic and scientific ones. The applied nature of risk assessment
requires both democratic and scientific control.
11 Id at 38.
12 Id at 19.
13 See Nicholas Ashford, Science and Values in the Regulatory Process, 3
Statistical Sci. 377 (1988).
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But how can democratic participation in some parts of assessment
be reasonable if we maintain the distinction between merely subjective
or perceived risks known by the public and actual risks known by the
experts?14 A partial answer is that, although some risks are merely
subjective, faulty perceptions are not the prerogative of the public alone.
All risks and risk estimates are perceived; at least because they are
unavoidably influenced by the categories, presuppositions and models
of the knower, they are susceptible to some level of uncertainty.
A major uncertainty is whether to define risk according to the
standard "body-count" view, as an expected number of deaths or
injuries, or to take account of other factors such as distributive equity
and consent. Uncertainty also arises because virtually no risk
probabilities reflect actual frequencies. Even the best estimates often
vary by at least two orders of magnitude. 15 Likewise, some of the
most important contributors to risk, such as human error, are not
amenable to quantification. More generally, risk estimates vary because
they are often based on different exposure or response models. 16 Still
other uncertainties arise, as Kahneman, Tversky and others have
shown,17 from heuristic judgmental strategies - such as
representativeness and overconfidence - to which experts are just as
susceptible as laypeople. To the degree that assessments rely on
uncertain perceptions or models, the public deserves a voice in the
assessment decisions about appropriate ethical behavior in situations of
uncertainty. The public deserves a voice because different ways of
responding to scientific uncertainty have different consequences for
assessment, policy and welfare.
Although science, as such, does not always have consequences for
public welfare and hence does not always involve judgments about
ethical values, no science can avoid judgments about methodological
values. Collecting and manipulating data, for example, requires goals
14 See William R. Freudenburg, Perceived Risk, Real Risk: Social Science and the
Art of Probabilistic Risk Assessment, 242 Science 44 (1988).
15 See Shrader-Frechette, supra note 6, at 81; see also Roger Cooke, Experts in
Uncertainty:. Opinion and Subjective Probability in Science, 30 ff (1991).
16 See Shrader-Frechette, supra note 6, at 82.
17 See id at 83.
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and hypotheses that are methodological values. Without these goals
and hypotheses, scientists would not have a criterion for which data and
models were relevant in a particular situation, and which were not.
Adjudicating disputes about which scientific methods or models to use
thus ultimately requires an appeal to methodological values. These
methodological values are more certain in situations where the science
and its applications are well understood. Yet, if the science and its
applications to a particular hazard were well understood, we wouldn't
need to do a risk assessment. We could simply apply deterministic
scientific laws and precisely predict hazards. Hence, because risk
assessment involves uncertainty and applications of science, it requires
value judgments.
None of these remarks about the value ladenness of risk assessment
are anything new to persons who study scientific methodology. As the
Redbook admitted:18
when scientific uncertainty is encountered in the risk
assessment process, inferential bridges are needed to allow
the process to continue.... The Committee has designated
these inference options.
After listing five pages of inference options (such as what degree of test
confirmation should be necessary and how one should extrapolate from
small to larger populations),19 the committee admitted: "policy
considerations inevitably affect, and perhaps determine, some of the
choices among the inference options."2
0
But if the Redbook admits that policy influences choices among
inference options, then it is arguable that the public ought to have a
voice in the evaluative or policy-related aspects of assessment. Why,
then, does the Redbook argue that risk management ought not affect
risk assessment?2 1 One reason may be language. The Redbook says
that policy choices affect inference options in risk assessment, but it
carefully uses the language of "inference options," not the language of
"methodological value judgments." 2 2
18 Supra note 4, at 28.
19 Id. at 28-33.
20 Id. at 33.
21 See id. at 152.
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However, even if the Redbook calls methodological value
judgments "inference options," both words flag choices under some
degree of uncertainty, choices having consequences for public health
and safety. Therefore the options or value judgments raise issues about
which those - whose welfare is affected . ought to have a voice.
Perhaps another reason the Redbook appears to contradict itself in
claiming that policy choices affect risk assessment, and yet that risk
management ought not affect assessment, is that the limits of scientific
expertise in assessment are not clear. Even the most recent NRC reports
continue to affirm both that risk assessment is a scientific process2 3
and that policy judgments are unavoidable in it.24 Also, because they
focus only on technical uncertainties, the standard discussions of
assessment appear to claim too wide a role for experts. The Redbook
notes, for example, that:25
The uncertainties.., in risk assessment can be grouped in two
general categories: missing... information on a particular
substance and gaps in current scientific theory.
In addition to gaps in scientific information or theory, however, the
Redbook seems to have ignored what I call "framing" uncertainties and
institutional uncertainties. 2 6 Institutional uncertainties arise because of
the inability of particular assessors or institutions to carry out reliable
assessments. As one NRC committee admitted: "the quality of risk
assessment depends in part on the capability of the analyst."2 7 The
22 This reminds me of how the Nuclear Regulatory Commission avoided the word
"accident" in its formal documents, instead using the phrase "extraordinary nuclear
occurrence;" see Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Nudear Power and Public Policy 96 if,
108 ff & 131 ff (1983). It also reminds me of the conversation in Through the
Looking Glass, when Humpty said to Alice: "When I use a word... it means just what
I choose it to mean."
23 See, e.g., Building Consensus, supra note 10, at 11, 13, 16 &27.
24 See, e.g., id at 1, 3, 17, 18 & 24.
25 The Redbook, supra note 4, at 28. See also Committee on Risk Assessment
Methodology, Issues in Risk Assessment 261 (1993) (e.g., identified "three general
categories of uncertainty that affect all types of risk assessments: measurement
uncertainties.., conditions of observation... inadequacies of models." The committee
mentioned nothing like framing uncertainty or institutional uncertainty.)
26 Uncertainties may be grouped according to sources or according to sorts. See,
e.g., Silvio Funtowicz & Jerome Ravetz, Uncertainty and Quality in Science for
Policy 21 ff(1990).
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institutions need to be, among other things, neutral, credible and
scientifically responsible. 28
Framing uncertainties arise from the way assessors interpret and
define relevant questions. Such uncertainties are crucial because those
who frame the questions often control the answers. For example, in the
Department of Energy's (DOE's) 1992 Early Site Suitability Evaluation
(ESSE) of the proposed Yucca Mountain high-level radioactive waste
facility, it framed the question of site assessment in terms of only two
options. 2 9 Scientists were told to conclude that the site was either
suitable or not, and that inability to prove it unsuitable was a sufficient
condition for site suitability. 30 The DOE did not allow a no-decision
finding, 3 1 even though peer reviewers unanimously warned that:
32
many aspects of site suitability.., predictions involving future
geologic activity.., rates of tectonic activity and volcanism...
will be fraught with substantial uncertainties that cannot be
quantified using standard statistical models.
By framing the question so as to disallow a "no decision" finding,
the DOE arguably commits the logical fallacies of appeal to ignorance
and begging the question. Inability to prove a site unsuitable is not a
sufficient condition for concluding it is suitable, especially given a lack
of comprehensive site data. 3 3 Logic and fairness tell us that this
framing biases the assessment conclusion. By ignoring value judgments
associated with framing, and by categorizing uncertainties in purely
techriical terms, 3 4 the standard risk paradigm overemphasizes the
expert assessment and underemphasizes stakeholder assessment.
Instead, as the Academy committee reviewing the DOE's
Environmental Remediation Program concluded:3 5
27 See, e.g., Building Consensus, supra note 10, at 21.
28 Id. at 37-38.
29 Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Burying Uncertainty- Risk and the Case against
Geological Disposal of Nuclear Waste 115 (1993).
30 See id. at 115, for ESSE quotation.
31 See id. at 119, for ESSE quotation.
32 Id at 118.
33 See id. at 103-126.
34 See NRC/NAS Committee on Risk Assessment of Hazardous Air Pollutants,
Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment 9-3 through 9-6 (1994).
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the multiple concerned parties, or stakeholders, need to be
involved throughout the whole process [of risk assessment]
beginning with planning, not just in the review of the results.
The standard paradigm also fails to address other important,
nontechnical uncertainties arising because of the way institutional goals,
such as promoting a particular technology, influence assessment. John
Kemeny, Chair of the committee that investigated Three Mile Island,
called the Nuclear Regulatory Commission "a total disaster. It was
clearly not part of the solution but a serious part of the problem."3 6
Although he was speaking of institutional bias in risk management,
similar concerns could affect risk assessment. Indeed, if Slovic, Layman
and Flynn are correct,37 then institutional biases or uncertainties may
explain the strong positive correlation between lack of trust in particular
risk assessors and perceived risk. Several Congressional investigations
and a 1994 NRC Report indicated that "the lack of trust in DOE," for
example, is a major impediment to reaching consensus" on certain
decisions. 3 8 Because such institutional uncertainties have potential
consequences for public health and safety, the public has a right to help
determine assessment responses to them.
Public Involvement in Assessment Does Not Threaten Objectivity
In response to framing, institutional and other uncertainties, a major
objection is that allowing public participation reduces scientific
objectivity. Such an objection, however, begs the question of whether
purely scientific objectivity is appropriate. Such objectivity may not be
appropriate if the NAS is correct that choosing particular "inference
options" is influenced by policy.3 9 Because of this, the objectivity
appropriate to many aspects of risk assessment may not be the
scientific objectivity of excluding outside evaluative influences, but
35 Building Consensus, supra note 10, at 1.
36 Cited in Clayton Gilette & James Krier, Risks, Courts and Agencies, 138 U. Pa.
L.Rev. 1096 (1990) (See id. for discussion of scientific versus participatory risk
assessment).
37 Paul Slovic, Mark Layman & James Flynn, Perceived Risk, Trust and Nuclear
Waste, in Public Reactions to Nuclear Waste 64 (1993).
38 Building Consensus, supra note 10, at 1.
39 The Redbook, supra note 4, at 37.
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rather the procedural objectivity of balancing influences through
representative participation. Giving stakeholders a voice in the inference
options or value judgments in assessments is one way to guarantee
procedural objectivity.
Another response to worries about objectivity is to recognize that,
even if scientists and stakeholders disagree about how to deal with
assessment uncertainties, the stakeholders are not necessarily irrational
in being averse to particular types of risk. After all, if a medical doctor
recommended one procedure rather than another, yet admitted
scientific uncertainties that plagued her recommendation, a perfectly
rational and objective patient might opt for allegedly riskier behavior
because it optimized other values such as comfort, recovery time, or
efficiency. Likewise, rational and objective risk assessment might invoke
policy values, rather than scientific values, in response to uncertainty.
Of course, objective risk assessment never ought to suggest that
members of the public make scientific judgments. Rather, it requires
extending the Redbook procedure of specifying the occasions on which
particular methodological value judgments or inference options are
likely to arise (e.g., in the context of framing uncertainty) and then
providing for public participation in determining these specific value
judgments or inference options.
Procedural Strategies for Involving the Public in Assessment
To provide for public participation in responding to assessment
uncertainty, 'at least two basic strategies come to mind. One is to use
public participation to develop a comprehensive list of "default options"
to employ in the face of various assessment uncertainties. Through a
variety of arbitration, negotiation, or adversary proceedings,4 0 dif-
ferent federal agencies could work with the public to investigate,
evaluate and select various assessment default options.
Default options are generic approaches applied at various stages of
the risk assessment process, either when there is some uncertainty or
when value or policy judgments are required. Default options, such as
40 Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Science Policy, Ethics, and Economic Methodology
286-313 (1985); see also Shrader-Frechette, supra note 6, at 169-219.
6 Risk Health, Safety & Environment 115 [Spring 19951
how to extrapolate from high-dose animal experiments to low-dose
cancer risk to humans,4 1 guide risk assessors in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, or they tell where to assign the burden of proof. For
instance, when framing and characterizing risk, at the outset of
assessment, one default option might be to assign the burden of proof
to those who want to limit risk to a purely quantitative definition or to
those who want to exclude consideration of the social, legal and ethical
aspects of risk, such as threats to future generations or to equitable risk
distribution. Admittedly consideration of such social and ethical risks
"is not standard practice in the field of risk assessment." 4 2 Never-
theless, as a NRC Committee (on DOE Remediation) put it:43
the scope of a risk assessment and the risk assessment itself
should be influenced by external or even global
considerations... of the stakeholders.
Some of the most important default options in risk assessment
arguably concern whether to minimize type-I or type-II errors in
situations of statistical uncertainty. For a variety of ethical reasons that I
have defended elsewhere, I think risk assessors ought to minimize type-
II errors (false negatives) rather than to follow the standard scientific
practice of minimizing type-I errors (false positives). 4 4 The rationale
for this assessment option is analogous to the rationale behind using
maximin decision rules for cases of probabilistic uncertainty involving
potentially catastrophic risk.4 5
A second strategy - besides using public participation to develop
general, agency-wide default options - would be to use some process
of negotiation or adversary assessment to develop case-specific rules of
judgment for dealing with uncertainty. For example, the Nevada
stakeholders ought to participate in formulating a decision rule for the
conditions under which to use porous media models to predict
hydrological flow at the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste
41 See supra note 34, at 2-4.
42 NRC/NAS Committee on Risk Perception and Communication, Improving
Risk Communication 38 (1989).
43 Building Consensus, supra note 10, at 17.
44 See supra note 6, at 131-145.
45 Op cit. at 100-130.
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repository, given that such models underestimate the groundwater
transport at heavily fractured sites. Although scientific expertise is
necessary to understand the characteristics of porous media models, the
health and safety consequences of using such models argue for public
participation in deciding whether and under what conditions to use
them at the- site.4 6 Likewise, the public ought to have a voice in
deciding case-specific rules regarding whether to characterize Yucca
Mountain risks qualitatively or in terms of subjective probabilities.
DOE assessors have used subjective probabilities, even though DOE
peer reviewers all agreed that there was substantial, "nonquantifiable
uncertainty" regarding future seismic, volcanic and tectonic activity.47
These two strategies, using public participation to develop default
options as well as case-specific rules of judgment, call for integrating
public decisionmaking into expert assessment. This might be
accomplished, in part, through something like the national and local
stakeholder boards recommended by a NRC/NAS risk committee.4 8
The lesson of such "integrated" assessment, to use Lash's term,4 9 is
that the public alone may be uninformed, whereas expert assessors alone
may ignore important uncertainties, value judgments and social risks.
Expert judgment, in particular, is insufficient for setting default options
and rules of judgment in risk assessment because (1) the rules must deal
ethically and evaluatively with uncertainty, (2) risk consequences affect
public welfare, and (3) risk consequences, not being merely technical,
ought not be assessed merely by scientists and technicians.
To relegate members of the public to participation only in risk
management and not also in risk assessment is to commit one version of
what Kenneth Keniston called "the fallacy of unfinished business," 5 0
the fallacy of assuming that all our risk controversies can be solved by
"business as usual" - by more and better technical analyses. To avoid
46 See supra note 29, at 61-65.
47 For the DOE peer reviewers' statement, see supra note 29, at 106-107.
48 Building Consensus, supra note 10, at 38.
49 Jonathan Lash, Integrating Science, Values and Democracy: Comparative Risk
Assessment As a Process for Pluralistic Policy Development, in Setting National
Environmental Policies (Adam Finkel & Dominic Golding, eds. 1992).
50 See Shrader-Frechette, supra note 40, at 106 ff.
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the fallacy of unfinished business, we need to learn to recognize the
social, ethical and procedural dimensions of risk assessment. This does
not mean, of course, that we exchange the flaws of technocratic
expertise for those of democratic participation. Members of the public,
as well as experts, are prisoners of their own environments. 5 1 We need
experts and the public, facts and values, assessment and management,
science and policy. We need expert analyses integrated with publicly
chosen default options and rules for judgment under uncertainty.
In remarrying risk assessment and management, expertise and
participation, we need to realize that either uninformed participation or
misplaced expertise can jeopardize the union. As Ralph Nader put it:
"If scientists think lawyers can present one-sided cases, they may wish
to rediscover themselves." 52 The same can be said for members of the
public.
51 This point is made well by Gilette and Krier, supra note 36, at 1027-1109
esp. at 1108.
52 Ralph Nader, Obligation of Scientists to Respond to Society's Needs in
Scientists in the Legal System (William A. Thomas, ed. 1974).
